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I. INTRODUCTION

Products liability litigation relating to mechanical devices has
centered on the concept of design defect, specifically, the unreasonable
failure of a manufacturer to take advantage of current design
capabilities that would reduce or even eliminate a product's potential
dangers. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
(Restatement (Third)), promulgated by the American Law Institute in
1997, therefore, places the focus of design-defect litigation on proof of
the existence of an alternative, safer design for a product, which
demonstrates that the product was not designed to be reasonably safe.'
t Editor's Note:
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1 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) cmt. d (1997).
The comment to section 2(b) explains:
[A] product asserted to have a defective design meets the
manufacturer's design specifications but raises the question whether
the specifications themselves create unreasonable risks ....
[T]he test
is whether a reasonable alternative design would, at reasonable cost,
have reduced the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product and,
if so, whether the omission of the alternative ... rendered the product
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During the four-year debate within the American Law Institute
(ALI) that resulted in the Restatement (Third), the alternative safer
design test for design defects gained considerable support from a series
of cases decided by the appellate division of the Superior Court of New
Jersey. In fact, two of the cases in that series were cited in the
commentary to the Restatement (Third) as support for the argument
that a new consensus had emerged regarding the proper test for design
defects.! In each of the five cases of the series, which included Smith v.
Keller Ladder Co.,' Mettinger v. W W Lowensten, Inc., Grzanka v. Pfeifer,5
Congiusti v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,6 and Green v. General Motors,7 the New
Jersey intermediate court relied on the proposed new test in order to
reach its final determination.'
Recently, in Lewis v. American Cyanamid Co.,9 the New Jersey
Supreme Court embraced this new standard, which requires a plaintiff
not reasonably safe ....

[T]he plaintiff must prove that such a

reasonable alternative was, or reasonably could have been, available at
time of sale or distribution.
Id. But see RESTATEMENT (Third) of TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY

§

6 (1997). Section 6,

which applies to prescription drugs and medical devices, states:
[a] prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to
defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or
medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable
therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-care providers, knowing of
such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe
the drug or medical device for any class of patients.
Id. (emphasis added).
2 See RESTATEMENT (Third) of TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 2(b)
Reporters' Note
(1997) (citing Smith v. Keller Ladder Co., 275 N.J. Super. 280, 284, 645 A.2d 1269,
1271 (App. Div. 1994); Grzanka v. Pfeifer, 301 N.J. Super. 563, 577-78, 694 A.2d 295,
303-04 (App. Div. 1997)). See generallyJamesA. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski,
Achieving Consensus on Defective ProductDesign, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 867 (1998).
275 N.J. Super. 280, 645 A.2d 1269 (App. Div. 1994).
4 292 N.J. Super. 293, 678 A.2d 1115 (App. Div. 1996), modifiedon othergrounds,
153
N.J. 371 (1998).
301 N.J. Super. 563, 694 A.2d 295 (App. Div. 1997).
6 306 N.J. Super. 126, 703 A.2d 340
(App. Div. 1997).
7 310 N.J. Super. 507, 709 A.2d 205 (App.
Div. 1998).
8 See Smith, 275 N.J. Super. at 284, 645 A.2d at 1271; Mettinger, 292
N.J. Super. at
311, 678 A.2d at 1124; Gnanka, 301 N.J. Super. at 577-78, 694 A.2d at 303; Congiusti,
N.J. Super. at 138-39, 703 A.2d at 346; Green, 310 N.J. Super. at 517-18, 709 A.2d at
210.
9 155 N.J. 544, 715 A.2d 967 (1998).
In Lewis, the plaintiff claimed that the
manufacturer of an insecticide could have used an alternative chemical that was onethird as flammable as the propellant that was actually used in the challenged design.
See id. at 552, 715 A.2d at 971. The NewJersey Supreme Court stated:
To succeed on his design-defect claim, plaintiff was required to prove
that a practical and feasible alternative design existed that would have
reduced or prevented his harm. Plaintiff attempted to meet this
burden by submitting P-22 [a stable propellant] as such an alternative.
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to show, in order to prove a product defective, that the manufacturer
unreasonably failed to adopt a practical and feasible alternative safer
design available at the time of the distribution of the product.'0
Moreover, the New Jersey Supreme Court's Model Civil Jury Charge
Committee, prior to the decision in Lewis, had prepared and approved
a new Model Charge regarding design defects, 5.34 C-1 to 4," which
provides a good start for changing the way juries are instructed on
design-defect issues. The committee, however, was somewhat tentative
in its formulations. Noting the absence of New Jersey Supreme Court
jurisprudence, the committee was reluctant to state that trial courts are
free to abandon the constraints of the boilerplate recitation of the six
risk-utility factors formulated twenty-six years ago by ALI Reporter and
Vanderbilt Law School Dean John Wade."
In Lewis, however, for the first time since it decided Cepeda v.
Cumberland Manufacturing Co.13 twenty-one years ago, the New Jersey
Supreme Court discussed a defective design case without reference to
the Wade risk-utility factors.4 This omission demonstrates that the time
To determine if P-22 was a practical and feasible alternative design, the
jury was required to perform a risk-utility analysis.
Id. at 560, 715 A.2d at 975 (citations omitted).
10 See id.

CML § 5.34 (1999).
See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products, 44 Miss. LJ.
825, 837-38 (1973) [hereinafter Wade, On the Nature]. This reluctance was also evident
in Congiusti, in which the court supported the Restatement (Third) standard but was
cautious about the continued use of the traditional Wade factors:
[I]n this case, as in most other design defect cases that are not
controlled by the absolute defenses to design defect claims in the
Products Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-3a, the issue centers upon
N.J. MODELJuRYCHARGES:

12

whether, in the words of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:

Products

Liability § 2(b) (1997 Proposed Final Draft), there was a "reasonable
alternative design . . . and the omission of the alternative design
renders the product not reasonably safe." This has been recognized in
Smith v. Keller Ladder Co., 275 N.J. Super. 280, 284, 645 A.2d 1269,
1271 (App. Div. 1994), and Grzanka v. Pfeifer, 301 N.J. Super. 563, 579,
694 A.2d 295 (App. Div. 1997). Although other possibly relevant elements of
a risk-utility analysis are to be charged unless or until the Supreme Court adopts
the Restatement standard, in most cases the inquiry as framed by the
Restatement will most probably present the issue to a jury in a clear
and well-defined manner.
Coniusti, 306 N.J. Super. at 138-39, 703 A.2d at 340 (emphasis added).
76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
See Lewis, 155 N.J. at 560, 715 A.2d at 975. In Cepeda, the NewJersey Supreme
Court stated:
Dean Wade suggests that before determining whether the case for
liability should be given to the jury the trial court should give
consideration to whether a balanced consideration of the following
factors did not preclude liability as a matter of law:
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has come to abandon the rote recitation of the Wade formulation and
to stop asking juries simply whether "the risks or dangers of a product
outweigh its usefulness."' 5 What should be asked instead is whether, in
light of the existence of a proposed alternative design, the product as
designed and sold was not reasonably safe.
We should begin to instruct juries in a more specific, more
flexible, and more product-centered manner about the factors they may
consider in deciding whether the challenged product is not reasonably
safe and, therefore, defective in design. New Jersey juries should be
instructed that they may consider a wide range of factors, such as
production costs, aesthetics, environmental concerns, and any other
competing considerations that a prudent, practical, and safetyconscious designer should weigh.
Model jury instructions, however, are limited in that they must
provide a uniform jury charge for a wide array of cases. Adaptation of
the instructions for the individual characteristics of a particular case is
given lip service, but departure from the model is uncommon. Juries in
New Jersey, as well as those across the country, receive little more
instruction than the broad statement of policy values underlying the
Wade factors or those factors suggested in Barkerv. Lull EngineeringCo.'6
(1)The usefulness and desirability of the product - its utility to
the user and to the public as a whole.
(2)The safety aspects of the product - the likelihood that it will
cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3)The availability of a substitute product which would meet the
same need and not be as unsafe.
(4)The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character
of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too
expensive to maintain its utility.
(5)The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in
the use of the product.
(6)The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in
the product and their avoidability, because of general public
knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the
existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7)The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading
the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability

insurance.
Cepeda, 76 N.J. at 173-74, 386 A.2d at 826-27 (citing Wade, On the Nature, supra note 12,
at 837-38 (1973)). The seventh factor, relating to insurance and price as risk-spreading
devices, has not been given to juries. See Fiorino v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 309 N.J.
Super. 556, 566-67, 707 A.2d 1053, 1058 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that charging the
jury with the seventh risk-utility factor was an error requiring a new trial).
N.J. MODELJURY CHARGES: CIVIL § 5.34B(2) (1989).
573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978). In Barker,the California Supreme Court stated that a
jury may consider the following as relevant factors in a design-defect case:
the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the
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The quality of decisions will be better served if jury instructions invite
the presentation of evidence and spur arguments that evoke the full
vibrancy of the moment of de'sign for the jury (and the court it assists).
The clamor of the competing considerations in the good and prudent
designer's mind should be heard in the courtroom and in the jury
room. If we can concretize the relevant design-defect considerations,
we will be better able both to hold the designer to the ideal of prudence
and to avoid the uncritical sympathy for the injured 7that courts have
long seen as a danger of unclear limitations on liability.'
II. PRODUCT DEFECT -

CHANGING FROM SECOND GEAR TO THIRD
GEAR

The NewJersey Products Liability Act, much like the Restatement
(Third),19 states that a defense to a product-defect claim exists if, at the
likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a
safer alternative design, the financial cost of an improved design, and
the adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer that
would result from an alternative design.
Id. at 455.
17 The line of expansion of bases for manufacturers'
liability can readily be traced
from Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 W. & M. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842) (privity
requirement stated for product defect claim), through McPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
111 N.E. 1050, 1051 (N.Y. 1916) (finding that auto purchaser has action against
manufacturer), to Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963)
(general abandonment of privity requirement and announcement of strict liability
for defective consumer products, presaging section 402A and modern "strict liability"
era), to Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1087 (5th Cir. 1973)
(applying section 402A to asbestos products liability claim for failure to test and
failure to warn of product dangers), and Beshada v. Johns Manville Products Corp., 90
N.J. 191, 209, 447 A.2d 539, 549 (1982) ("As between those innocent victims and the
distributors, it is the distributors - and the public which consumes their products which should bear the unforeseen costs of the product."), and O'Brien v. Muskin
Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1982) (allowingjury to find that risks of recreational
product outweigh its utility and impose liability even in absence of safer design).
The archetypal decisions of the present era may not yet have been written, but
we should look for candidates in tobacco, breast implant, blood product, handgun,
drug, and other cases of mass-marketed products with powerfully symbolic health
consequences.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-1 to C-7 (West 1987).
The Restatement (Third) provides:
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it
contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective
because of inadequate instructions or warnings. A product:
(b)is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by
the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or
other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of
distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders
the product not reasonably safe.
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time of distribution of the product, there "was not a practical and
technically feasible alternative design that would have prevented the
harm."2
The Restatement (Third), in its core sections - section 2(b)
has
(design defect) and section 2(c) (inadequate warning) 2
grounded the main body of products liability litigation ' unmistakably
in the law of negligence.
By reference to section 283 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts,22 in the comments to section 2,23 the
ALI has expressly embraced negligence, i.e., the "reasonable man"
standard, and (except for manufacturing defects) announced its
The strict
practical abandonment of the strict liability approach.
liability approach was undertaken first by the California Supreme Court
in 1963 in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,25 and subsequently
adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 6 Even though the New
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:

PRODUCTS

LIABILITY

§ 2(b) (1997) (emphasis

added).

§ 2A:58C-3 a(1) (West 1987).
Manufacturing defects, defined in section 2(a) as unintended departures from
design specifications, and the vicarious liability of sellers for design defects they did not
create, remain the only truly "strict" liability elements under the Restatement (Third),
despite the continued preference of many courts for the language of strict liability. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (1997).
See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965) ("Unless the actor is a child,
the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a
reasonable man under like circumstances.").
23 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 2 cmt. d (1997).
The comments explain that "[tlhe policy reasons that support use of a reasonableperson perspective in connection with the general negligence standard also support
its use in the products liability context." Id.
2
See David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict" Products Liability
Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 743, 748 [hereinafter Owen, Defectiveness Restated].
Owen states:
Strict liability in tort has occupied the core of modern products liability
doctrine ever since Dean Prosser first penned the most often cited
Restatement section in history - section 402A of the Second
Restatement of Torts ....
More specifically, by pulling design and
warnings cases away from those involving manufacturing defects,
section 1 permits the retention of strict liability in the latter context,
where almost all agree that it belongs, while abandoning the strict
liability concept for negligence principles in design and warning cases
which comprise the bulk of products liability law and litigation.
Id.
25 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) ("A manufacturer is strictly
liable in tort when an
article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for
defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being. Recognized first
in the case of unwholesome food products, such liability has now been extended to a
variety of other products that create as great or greater hazards if defective.").
N.J. STAT. ANN.

21

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

following:

OF TORTS

§ 402A (1965). Section 402A provides the
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Jersey Supreme Court has made clear that the use of a risk-utility
balancing test means that the "reasonably prudent" standard will apply
to product manufacturers in design-defect (and warning) cases,27 the
language of strict liability has continued to adhere firmly to products
liability law.
In certain rare cases, the question arises of whether a
manufacturer is reasonable to sell a particular product in any form. For
example, in O'Brien v. Muskin Corp.,28 the manufacturer of above-ground
swimming pools argued that its product could not be made safer and
that the risk of catastrophic injury could not be eliminated. The New
Jersey Supreme Court responded:
To establish sufficient proof to compel submission of the issue to
the jury for appropriate fact-finding under risk-utility analysis, it
was not necessary for plaintiff to prove the existence of
alternative, safer designs. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, even if there are no alternative methods of
making bottoms for above-ground pools, the jury might
3 0 have
found that the risk posed by the pool outweighed its utility.

The NewJersey Products Lability Act (the Act) has relegated such
gross risk-utility assessments to cases of products like that in O'Brien,
(1)One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a)the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b)it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2)The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a)the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b)the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.

27 See Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J.
152, 175 n.5, 386 A.2d 816, 827
n.5 (1978). In Cepeda, the NewJersey Supreme Court stated:
It must be recognized that since this formulation of liability is based
upon whether a "reasonable prudent" manufacturer (with assumed
knowledge of the dangerous proclivity of the article) would have
marketed the article, Subsection (2) (a) of Rest. 2d Sec. 402A is not
applicable in design defect cases. Subsection (2) states: "the rule stated in
Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparationand sale of his product."
Id. (emphasis added).
28 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298
(1983).
29 See id. at 184-85, 463
A.2d at 306.
0 Id.
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products that present egregious risk and have little social utility.3
Environmental torts, such as asbestos exposure, were excluded from the
Act and remain the subject of strict liability causes of action. But the
bulk of products liability litigation has not been focused on such an
equation the walk-the-plank choice between an inherently,
unavoidably dangerous product and its general social utility. In the
ordinary case, it has been necessary to choose between two versions of
the same product. Products liability design litigation has centered on
the reasonableness of the design choices of the manufacturer.
Successful New Jersey plaintiffs, as with successful plaintiffs elsewhere, 3
have proven their design-defect claims by posing an alternative design
for the same product.
The new Model Charge abandons the routine recitation of the
Wade risk-utility factors. Moreover, in design-defect cases, the new
31 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3(b) (West 1987).

That section provides that a
manufacturer will not be able to claim the absence of a safer design as a defense if
there is clear and convincing evidence showing:
(1)The product is egregiously unsafe or ultra-hazardous;
(2)The ordinary user or consumer of the product cannot reasonably be
expected to have knowledge of the product's risks, or the product
poses a risk of serious injury to persons other than the user or
consumer; and
(3)The product has little or no usefulness.
Id.
32 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-6 (West 1987) ("The provisions
of this act shall not
apply to any environmental tort action."). The New Jersey Products Liability Act
defines an environmental tort action as a civil action seeking damages for harm when
the cause of the harm is exposure to toxic chemicals or substances, but does not mean
actions involving drugs or products intended for personal consumption or use." N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-1 (4) (West 1987). Also, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in
Beshada v. Johns Manville Products Corp., stated that "(i]f that product caused more harm
than good, it was not reasonably fit for its intended purposes. We can therefore impose
strict liability for the injuries it caused without having to determine whether it could
have been rendered safer." 90 N.J. 191, 201, 447 A.2d 539, 545 (1982). However, in
Becker v. Baron Bros., Coliseum Auto Parts,Inc., the NewJersey Supreme Court stated:
The Appellate Division's determination, which approved the trial
court's charge to the jury, that all asbestos-containing products without
warnings are defective as a matter of law was error. That error deprived
the jury of the opportunity to determine whether the asbestos product
was in fact dangerous, and rendered premature and unfounded the
court's application of the risk-utility analysis and its conclusion that
without a warning the asbestos product was defective as a matter of law.
138 N.J. 145, 166, 649 A.2d 613, 623 (1994).
3
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 reporters' notes
(1997) (citing Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 96 (Minn. 1987) (stating
that, in establishing that a product was unreasonably dangerous, "[e]xamination of
our cases . . . [alleging] defective design demonstrates that, as a practical matter,
successful plaintiffs, almost without fail, introduce evidence of an alternative safer
design").
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Model Charge omits the usual macro-balance3 4 question that has been a
fixture of New Jersey's jury instructions, namely, whether "the risks or
dangers of using a product outweigh its usefulness and, therefore, a
reasonably careful manufacturer or supplier would not have sold the
product at all in the form in which it was sold."'55
Liability based on a comparison of the product's overall utility with
its risks of harm (an equation practically impossible to establish in the
courtroom) 36 is, as Professor Green has persuasively argued, based on
an irrelevancy. 7 If such a theory is to be used, it is certainly left to the
See David G. Owen, Toward a Proper Test for Design Defectiveness: "Micro-Balancing"
Costs and Benefits, 75 TEx. L. REv. 1661, 1664 (1997) [hereinafter Owen, MicroBalancing]. In his article, Owen
argues that design defectiveness is best determined by using a form of
"micro-balance" which focuses on the costs and benefits of adopting
the particular alternative design feature proposed by the plaintiff,
rather than by attempting a global "macro-balance" of all the risks and
benefits of either the chosen or the alternative design. Thus, if the
plaintiff frames the issue in terms of the defectiveness of an outboard
motor not equipped with a propeller guard, the proper inquiry
concerns the balance of costs and benefits that would result from
adding such a guard - not the costs and benefits of outboard motors
generally, without such guards, and certainly not the broader costs and
benefits of power boats propelled by motors.
Id.
5 N.J. MODELJURY CHARGES: CML § 5.34B(2)
(1989).
36 How would one do it?
On the costs side, how can one show the actual rate of
accidents and severity of loss absent the rare epidemiological study based on the type of
machine? How long should one assume the risk will exist - what is the useful life of
the machine? On the benefit side, how would one estimate the social utility of punch
presses? Or automobiles, trains, or planes? See Michael D. Green, Negligence = Economic
Efficiency: Doubts, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1605, 1638-39 (1997) (stating that, even when one has
moved to evaluating the marginal advantage of one design over another, estimating
frequency and severity of loss is highly problematic).
See Michael D. Green, The Schizophrenia of Risk-Benefit Analysis in Design Defect
Litigation, 48 VAND. L. REV. 609, 620 (1995) [hereinafter Green, Schizophrenia].
Green makes the following observations:
What of the utility of the product? Irrelevant to the analysis. What we
are interested in is the marginal utility of the existing design, not the
overall societal benefits of the product. To put the point another way,
imagine that we have identified a one hundred percent effective
vaccine for AIDS. Suppose the vaccine causes a mild auto-immune
reaction - a rash that lasts for a week - in one out of a million
persons who take the vaccine. The side effect can be eliminated by
changing one of the inert ingredients with which the vaccine is coated
to another inert ingredient, no more expensive and equally adept at
serving its purpose. The vaccine is defectively designed despite its
enormous social utility. Risk-benefit analysis operates at the margin the utility of the existing design compared to the alternative - not at
the level of the entire product.
Id. at 619.
34
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rare case. Justice Pollock recognized the dichotomy in Lewis v. American
Cyanamid C.38
We typically make such a search in a case like Truchan v. Nissan
Motor Corp. in US.A."9 In Truchan, the plaintiff, a rear-seat passenger,
suffered catastrophic injuries allegedly due to a poor seat belt design. 0
In such a situation, we do not question the utility of automobiles, or of
seat belts. Rather, the safety of the defendant's design is challenged by
the posing of a hypothetical design alternative.
The new Model Charge, therefore, directs the jury to focus on the
comparative benefits or dangers of the product as sold versus those of
the hypothetical alternative proposed by the plaintiff. The essential
message of the charge is this: A safer mousetrap is the heart of a
products liability case, as Judge Cook observed a few years ago. 41 The
safer mousetrap must not be too expensive, must allow the machine to
perform its essential rodenticidal function, and must not create
practical problems, such as new dangers as worrisome (to the hunter)
as the original.
As comfortable as we are with the Restatement (Third) standard,
we should avoid suggesting that New Jersey has or should adopt by
reference section 2 of the Restatement (Third). As with any such
document, the Restatement (Third) is persuasive authority only. Our
law cannot and should not be simply a reflection of a scholarly
consensus document, no matter how appealing the approach presented
by that document may be. NewJersey has partially codified its products
liability law and will continue to develop its own common law, guided
by the broad42 parameters the Legislature set forth in the Products
Liability Act.

155 N.J. 544, 570, 715 A.2d 967, 980 (1998). The New Jersey Supreme Court
stated:
Our decision to sustain the denial of defendant's motion for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict should not be interpreted as
altering the parties' burden of proof. In a design-defect case, the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof. A plaintiff must prove either that the
product's risks outweighed its utility or that the product could have been
designed in an alternative manner so as to minimize or eliminate the risk of
harm. Plaintiffs who assert that the product could have been designed

more safely must prove under a risk-utility analysis the existence of an
alternative design that is both practical and feasible.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
39 316 N.J. Super. 554, 720 A.2d 981 (App. Div. 1998).
40 See id. at 558, 720 A.2d at 983.
41

See William J. Cook, A Better Mousetrap: The Heart of a Product Liability Case, Civ.

TRiAL B. SEC. NEWSl (NewJersey State Bar Association), Spring/Summer 1993, at 9.
42 The new Model Charge does not "adopt" section 6(c) of the Restatement
(Third), which, unlike our statute, would exclude drug products liability cases -
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This tension is dramatically illustrated in Perez v. Wyeth
Laboratories, Inc., in which the NewJersey Supreme Court held that
the realities of direct, massive advertising of drugs to consumers
"belies each of the premises on which the learned intermediary
doctrine [defense] rests."" The court concluded that the doctrine,
an exception to the manufacturer's duty to warn consumers directly,
simply "drops out of the calculus, leaving the duty of the
manufacturer to be determined in accordance with the general

setting a strict, "objective standard." See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 6 (1997). That section provides that a drug product or medical device is
not defective if a reasonable medical practitioner would find that it is a net benefit to at
least one class of patients. See id. The classic example of the principle is the new-found
utility of the teratogen thalidomide as a treatment for leprosy.
The effect of the section 6 rule - which is inconsistent with our statute - is to
place the entire burden of a prescription drug or medical device's dangers on the
physician. In contrast, the Products Liability Act makes no distinction between
medical devices and other products. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-1 to C-7 (West
1987). The Restatement (Third) continues a rule that existed in the Restatement
(Second) that excluded drugs from strict liability. The rule has never been accepted
by the New Jersey Supreme Court. In Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories Inc., the New
Jersey Supreme Court saw "no reason to hold as a matter of law and policy that all
prescription drugs that are unsafe are unavoidably so.
Drugs, like any other
products, may contain defects that could have been avoided by better manufacturing
or design." Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories Inc., 97 N.J. 429, 447, 479 A.2d 374, 384
(1984).
The Restatement (Third) authors argue that the restrictive drug and medical
device rule is needed to assure that "manufacturers have ample discretion to develop
useful drugs and devices without subjecting their design decisions to the ordinary
test applicable to products generally." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABiLrlv § 6 cmt. b (1997). Regardless of the rule, now, as before, most drug and
medical device cases will focus on the warnings, rather than on the design.
There are some exceptions to the warning focus in drug and medical device
cases. One exception is the failure to develop blood pasteurization techniques for
hemophiliacs who receive blood products, which the National Academy of Sciences
criticized in a 1995 report. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, HIV AND THE BLOOD SUPPLY 95
(1995). Another exception are the design-defect claims over silicone gel breast
implants. Those devices, despite the inability to date to connect them convincingly
to serious systemic injury, have been sharply criticized because of industry failure to
adequately test them for safety. See generally Rebecca S. Dresser et al., Breast Implants
Revisited: Beyond Science on Trial, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 705 (1997). The usual focus on
warnings and medical malpractice, however, will be seen in the "fen-phen" litigation
now shaping up around the country.
43 161 N.J. 1, 734 A.2d 1245 (1999).
Id. at 19, 734 A.2d at 1256. These premises, which the majority finds to
be
based on a "Norman Rockwell," doctor-knows-best image of doctors that is no longer
present in this era of managed care, are: (1) reluctance to undermine the doctorpatient relationship; (2) absence in the era of "doctor knows best" of the need for
the patient's informed consent; (3) inability of the drug manufacturer to
communicate with patients; and (4) complexity of the subject. See id. at 18, 734 A.2d
at 1255.
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principles of tort law.0 5 Prescription drug manufacturers that market
their products directly may, therefore, be liable to consumers if their
advertising fails to provide adequate warning of the products'
dangers. Dissenting, Justices Pollock and Garibaldi suggested that
the majority had overstepped its bounds because the Product Liability
Act 46 adopted the learned intermediary doctrine.

7

The dissenting

justices also stated that the majority could not properly rely on, much
less expand, the Restatement (Third)'s suggestion that imposing a
duty to warn the patient directly is warranted "when the
manufacturer knows or has reason to know that health-care providers
will not be in a position to reduce4 s the risks of harm in accordance
with the instructions or warnings.

III. MACRO-BALANCING VS. MICRO-BALANCING

The Reporters of the Restatement (Third), Professors Twerski and
Henderson, are, of course, correct in their assertion that the core
concept of products liability law is design defect. The professors
describe design defect as "the conceptual linchpin that holds products
liability law together" and note that "a system of liability without defect
is beyond the capacity of courts to implement.0 9 These fears aside, no
one has ever seriously challenged that proposition - the trick has been
to define "defect".
Successful instructions under the Restatement (Third) and the
New Jersey products liability statute must be defect-focused. In a
trenchant criticism of the Wade factors, Professor David G. Owen,
editorial advisor for the Restatement (Third), developed a new
Id. at 19, 734 A.2d at 1256.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.58C-1 to C-1I (West 1987).
47 See Perez, 161 N.J. at 35, 734 A.2d at 1266; see also N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:58C-4
(West 1987) (codifying the learned intermediary doctrine in the Products Liability
Act).
45

46

Perez, 161 N.J. at 38, 734 A.2d at 1267.
James A. Henderson,Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability
Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1263, 1267 (1991). The
future co-reporters sounded an alarm against the supposed threat of "liability without
defect." See id. at 1266-69.
Henderson and Twerski traced the "intellectual roots" of the asserted threat of
widespread "liability without defect . . . to the beginnings of the strict products
liability movement." Id. at 1267. In particular, Henderson and Twerski identified
Dean Wade's seven "risk-utility factors" as having "anticipated the liability-withoutdefect movement." Id. An exemplar of the feared trend, in the view of Henderson
and Twerski, wasJustice Pollock's opinion in O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 463
A.2d 298 (1983), which they feared would open the floodgates to "product-category"
liability claims against products of low utility and high risk, such as alcoholic
beverages, cigarettes, or handguns. See id. at 1267.
48
49
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approach to jury instructions. Addressing a problem that has created
great confusion, the fact that juries are instructed to decide whether a
product's dangers "outweigh" its utility as a whole, Professor Owen
explains:
[d]eep within the interior of design defect jurisprudence,
balancing bedlam prevails. Courts and commentators increasingly
comprehend that ascertaining design defectiveness in products
liability cases requires some kind of "risk-utility" balancing, but
neither courts nor commentators seem to understand just what
that balance should entail. In case after case, courts uphold
verdicts rooted in risk-utility proof and argument - on the
balance of costs and benefits of improving the safety of a
product's design - without inquiring closely into how to
formulate the balance properly. And when most courts and
commentators do attempt to define the balance, to state with
some precision just what should be balanced against what, they
quickly lose themselves, conceptually and linguistically, in a
tangled thicket of "risks" and "benefits" and "costs" and "utility. "
The utility of automobiles is great and surely outweighs their dangers.
Even the utility of the "unsafe at any speed" Corvair probably
outweighed its dangers. But utility does not mean that such a car has
no defect. The traditional jury charge failed to convey the meaning of
"defective": that the dangers created by the product reasonably could
have been reduced without destroying the transportation utility of the
car, and thus the failure to reduce those dangers was an unreasonable
safety choice.
New Jersey's Model Charge has, until now, articulated the riskutility discussion as follows:
A design defect (also) may be established by proof that the risks or
dangers of using a product outweigh its usefulness and, therefore, a

reasonably careful manufacturer or supplier would not have sold
the product at all in the form in which it was sold. A product may
not be considered reasonably safe unless the risks have been
reduced to the greatest extent possible consistent with the
product's continued utility."
The explicit message of this charge is to weigh the usefulness of the
product as a whole against its particular avoidable dangers. Of course,
one can counter correctly that the question the court is really asking is
whether the manufacturer reasonably could have avoided the dangers
with an alternative design and whether the manufacturer should have
50 David G. Owen, Risk-Utility Balancing in Design Defect Cases, 30 U. MICH.
J.L.
REFoRM 239, 239-40 (1997) [hereinafter Owen, Risk-Utility Balancing].
51 N.J. MODELJURY CHARGES: CIVIL § 5.34B(2) (1989) (emphasis added).
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altered the product for safety reasons. The New Jersey Model Charge,
however, has not clearly expressed that question. Professor Owen
attributes the problem to appellate courts, rather than to trial judges
and lawyers:
A national survey of recent appellate court decisions reveals that
courts generally define the balance in terms of the product's risks
and utility, a formulation which appears to call for weighing the
product's global costs against the product's global benefits. So
defined, the design defect test is incorrect. What appellate courts
mean for juries to decide, and what juries ordinarily do in fact
decide, is the much more narrow "micro-balancd' of the costs and

benefits of the particular design feature that the plaintiff claims
the manufacturer ought to have adopted. If courts reformulate
the test of design defectiveness in this more precise 52and focused
manner, design defect litigation should be improved.
The primary question that must be addressed is how to restructure the
Model Charge, a subject that Professor Owen addressed in a later
article.53 Professor Owen's essential point is that juries should balance
the costs and benefits of the alternative design against those of the
original design and should ask if the decision of the manufacturer to
sell the product in the form in which it was designed was reasonable in
light of the existence of a practical, feasible alternative (the absence of
which is a statutory defense in New Jersey).5
IV. REVISED CHARGE FOCUSES ON THE PRECAUTION NOT TAKEN
Under a revised charge, the risks that a jury must compare are

those of the product as it was designed and those of the alternative
design. The essential question for the jury remains the same: Was the
product reasonably safe in the form in which it was sold? A more
probative question, however, is whether the safety gains that the
alternative would provide demonstrate that the decision to sell the
product as it was actually designed was an unreasonable decision. This
modified approach has the advantage of conveying the hornbook legal
principle that, in order to fairly impose liability, the burden of avoiding
harm must be reasonable in light of the risk and seriousness of the

foreseeable harm. This is a notion that every law student knows, having
read Judge Learned Hand's opinion in United States v. Carroll Towing
55

Co.

52

5
55

Owen, Risk-Utility Balancing,supra note 50, at 239 (emphasis added).
See Owen, Micro-Balancing,supra note 34, at 1661.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3 (West 1987).
159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
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The new Model Charge 5.34 C-1 to 4 adopts the narrower microbalancing approach. Under the new charge, New Jersey courts will
instructjuries in design-defect cases as follows:
Plaintiff claims that the [product] was defectively designed
because it did not employ a reasonable safer design. To establish
his/her claim of design defect, [plaintiff] must prove by the
greater weight of the credible evidence that:
a. The product was designed in a defective manner.
A design defect exists if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by
the [product] could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption
of a reasonable design and the omission of the alternative design
renders the product not reasonably safe.
(Presumption of Knowledge)
In proving a defect in the design of a product, [plaintif/] need
not prove that [defendant manufacturer/seller] knew that the
accident in this case could happen as it did. Knowledge of the
dangers of the product and the possibility of such an event is
legally placed upon the manufacturer/seller. The question for
you to decide is whether, assuming the defendant(s) knew the
dangers of the product, it (they) were nevertheless reasonably
careful in the manner in which it (they) designed (marketed or
sold) the [product].
[Plaintif] claims that the [product] should have contained the
following: [briefly describe reasonablesafer design feature].
[Defendant] on the other hand claims that the [product] should
not have contained the alternative design because [briefly
describe the reasons for rejecting proposed reasonable safer
design feature].
You are to decide whether the safety benefits from altering the
design as proposed by [plaintifJ] were greater than the resulting
costs or disadvantages caused by the proposed design, including
any diminished usefulness or diminished safety. If the failure to
incorporate a practical and technically feasible safer alternative
design made the [product] not reasonably safe, then the [product]
was designed in a defective manner.
If, on the other hand, [plaintiff] has not proven there existed a
practical and technically feasible safer alternative, or if you find
that the [product] as designed was reasonably56 safe, then the
[product] was not designed in a defective manner.
This new Model Charge centers on a comparison between the
challenged design and the plaintiffs alternative design. Although the
56 N.J. MODELJuRYCHARGES: CIVIL§ 5.34C-3 (1999).
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test still involves a risk-utility analysis, the test functions by requiring
differing designs to compete as whole products, rather than by
weighing the benefits the product provides against the dangers the
product can cause. Thus, in Truchan, the case should turn on issues
such as whether the manufacturer was reasonable in supplying only lap
belts in the back seat, whether a lap and shoulder belt combination
would have prevented the plaintiffs dreadful injuries, and, perhaps, if
the seat belt as designed was dangerous to a reclining passenger, or
whether warnings would have sufficed. 5 These issues still involve a riskutility analysis, but the focus is placed on the reasonableness of the
challenged aspects of the design.58
The objective of this new model jury charge is to present squarely
to the jury the central issue -

the micro-balance -

of whether the

manufacturer's decision to market the product was reasonable when
the risks of the product are compared against the feasibility,
practicability, and increased safety of the plaintiffs alternative design.
V. WHAT MORE CAN WE Do?
Having shifted the focus of jury instructions to the micro-balance
approach, I suggest that three more issues must be addressed:
(1)How should courts instructjuries beyond the bare-bones
formulation of the new charge to assist them in
evaluating the plaintiffs' proofs and the defenses raised
in a product-specific context?
(2)How should courts instruct juries on the issue of
availability of the alternative safer design? It depends on
what the meaning of "was" is.59
57 Likely not.
Even if Nissan were able to prove that the dangerous
"characteristics of the product are known to the ordinary consumer or user," a
defense under the Products Liability Act, the exception for feasible alternative
designs means that "if a plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant could have eliminated the danger without impairing the usefulness of the
product, then the product might be defectively designed even though the defendant has proved the
3a(2) defense" Roberts v. Rich Foods, Inc., 139 N.J. 365, 379, 654 A.2d 1365, 1372
(1995) (emphasis added).
Here, we identify the seller of the product, whether the manufacturer or the
distributor, with the designer and extend the moment of design to the time of
distribution. Also, we should recognize that, like the reasonably prudent man of
section 283 of the Restatement (Second), the reasonably prudent designer is a fiction

-

and probably not a person at all, but an organization.

59
Compare how we now instruct juries on knowledge of the harmful effects of
products in warning cases:
In this case [Defendant] contends that [describe danger]was not knowable
at the time the [Product]was manufactured/sold. If [Defendant] proves

that the danger in question was not knowable by it at the time of
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(3)Should courts instruct juries that the duty of the
manufacturer is to "minimize or eliminate" harm, as the
New Jersey Supreme Court writes in Lewis, or should the
duty be stated simply as the achievement of reasonable
safety?
Professor Green has observed that a "schizophrenia" permeates
the risk-utility analysis. 6° This schizophrenia is manifested in the tension
between "first, the rigorous, precise, green-eyeshade version provided
by welfare economics and, second, the softer, reasonableness version.'
The first approach, the law and economics mode of analysis that asserts
societal wealth maximization as the driving force of tort law, is
contrasted with the "tort law with a human face" approach.62 The
former is identified foremost with writers such as Judge Richard A.
M
Posner6 and Professor W. Kip Viscusi.6
The latter, according to
manufacture or sale, then it had no duty to warn of the danger and
cannot be held liable for failure to do so. In evaluating this defense of
[Defendant], you may consider evidence relating to [Defendant's]
knowledge of the danger of the [Product]. A duty to warn arises if
[Defendant] (the manufacturer/seller) actually knew or should have
known of the need to issue a particular warning.
In determining what [Defendant] should have known, you must
understand that the law requires a manufacturer/seller to keep
reasonably familiar with and to know reliable information generally
available or reasonably obtainable in the industry. In that regard,
[Defendant] is deemed to be an expert in its field. This information
may come from experts and literature in the field.
Moreover,
information from other sources such as complaints from users, sellers
or distributors of an untoward effect of a product may be sufficient to
require an appropriate warning.
N.J. MODEL JURY CHARGES: CrVIL § 5.34B (1999). For background on the handling of
the presumed knowledge issue in NewJersey, seeJohn E. Keefe & Richard C. Henke,
Presumed Knowledge of Danger: Legal Fiction Gone Awry?, 19 SETON HALL L. REv. 174
(1989). Keefe and Henke state that, since its 1982 decision in Beshada v. Johns Manville
Products Cop., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982), the New Jersey Supreme Court has
recoiled from the theory (sometimes called the Wade-Keeton rule) that knowledge at
the time of trial, not the time of distribution, governs liability determinations. See id. at
174. The authors also noted that "strict products liability law in NewJersey" should
embrace Wade's abandonment of the Wade-Keeton rule. See id. at 175 (citingJohn W.
Wade, On the Effect in Products Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58
N.Y.U. L. REv. 734, 761-64 (1983)).
60 See generally Green, Schizophrenia, supra note
37, at 609 (1995).
61

Id. at 613.

See id. at 618. By contrast with the economic version of risk-benefit analysis,
one commentator has observed that "[t]ort law is law with a human face." Peter H.
62

Schuck, Introduction: The Context of the Controversy, in
INTEREST 21 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991).

TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC

See, e.g., RCHARDA. POSNER, ECONOMicANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992).
See, e.g., Todd v. Societe BIC, 9 F.3d 1216, 1221 (7th Cir. 1993)

(en banc)
(providing an excellent example of Viscusi's green-eyeshade mode of analysis). In
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Professor Greei, is identified with Dean Wade and others who reject
the monetization of risk as a mode of analysis adequate for tort law.6
Professor Green also has observed that the new "Restatement
stands right about in the middle, unwilling to make an explicit choice
between the two."66 I suggest that New Jersey stands in just about the
same place; and such positioning is a good thing.
The problem of incommensurability - of diverse and competing
values - in tort law cannot be wished away. 67 The commonly accepted
discussing child-resistant cigarette lighter safety, the Seventh Circuit stated:
Both costs and benefits are elusive. The [Consumer Products Safety
Commission] estimates that, child-resistant lighters would cost
approximately 15 to 20 cents more per unit in the marketplace ....
About 678 million lighters are sold in the United States each year. The
CPSC could not estimate total costs because it did not know what
would happen to sales at the higher prices (particularly for "specialty"
lighters, which sell in smaller quantities and therefore would incur
much higher per-unit costs of compliance). Users of the lighters will
suffer some inconvenience, which also counts as a cost - especially to
older users whose fingers may not be strong or nimble enough. The
benefits look clear enough: by the CPSC's estimate, the total cost of
fires set by children under five playing with lighters is $385 million per
year ....At first glance, the benefits easily exceed the costs. But childresistant lighters will not eliminate the fires. Child-resistant is not
child-proof; the CPSC estimates that 15 percent of children will be able
to use the lighters notwithstanding the safeguards and will set 30
percent of the former number of fires .... The cost and inconvenience
will lead some adults to switch from lighters to matches, posing fire
hazards of their own (which CPSC estimates at one-third of the risk of
lighters), or to refillable lighters, which are not covered by the rule.
And all child-resistant designs present a subtle risk. Parents who
(mistakenly) believe that the products are child-proof are more likely
to leave them within youngsters' reach. Instead of having zero ability
to play with lighters, formerly out of their grasp, these children now
have a 15 percent chance of being able to set a fire. A false sense of
security could be fatal. The introduction of child-resistant medicine
bottles actually led to an increase in certain kinds of poisonings as
parents relaxed their vigilance.
Id. (citing W. Kip Viscusi, Consumer Behavior and the Safety Effects of Product Safety
Regulation, 28J.L. & ECON. 527, 53748 (1985)).
See Green, Schizophrenia, supranote 37, at 618.
6
Id. at 615-16.
67 Judge Hand, whose Carroll Towing Co. formula is the talisman
of the law and
economics approach to tort law, observed in onway v. O'Brien:
The degree of care demanded of a person by an occasion is the
resultant of three factors: the likelihood that his conduct will injure
others, taken with the seriousness of the injury if it happens, and
balanced against the interest which he must sacrifice to avoid the risk.
All these are practically not susceptible of any quantitative estimate,
and the second two are generally not so, even theoretically. For this
reason a solution always involves some preference, or choice between
incommensurables, and it is consigned to a jury because their decision
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standards the jury brings to court will not accept a simple calculus of life
and safety. The punitive damages award based on the famous Ford
Motor Company memo in the Pinto cases (which balanced the costs of
wrongful death actions against a safer, non-explosive gas tank)
demonstrates that a deep strain of animosity can be tapped by
monetizing safety. 6
But part of the stark reality is, as Professor Green observes, that
lives are to be balanced with dollars.6 Jurors must take into account the
economic market factors that drive manufacturers' design choices.
Those factors are part of the reasonably prudent manufacturer's
circumstances, as articulated by section 283 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. Jurors, however, also bring a diverse array of values
appropriate to the manufacturer's circumstances by recognizing that
not all conflicting demands can be placed on a "single metric." In fact,
courts should instruct jurors to recognize that in order to invoke the
diversity of competing values. We should confront, not side-step, the
deep challenge that such incommensurability of values presents to
valuation in the law.70
is thought most likely to accord with commonly accepted standards,
real or fancied.
11 F.2d 611,612 (2d Cir. 1940).
68 Green describes the case, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal.
Rptr. 348 (Ct.
App. 1981), as follows:
The case involved a rear-end collision of a Ford Pinto, in which a
thirteen year old passenger suffered devastating burns when the Pinto's
gas tank ruptured and the leaking gasoline caught fire. The location of
the gas tank, behind the rear axle, its construction, and the strength of
the rear structure of the Pinto were alleged to constitute design defects
that resulted in the fire. The question of a risk-benefit analysis of the
gas tank and rear structure design played a central role in the case, in
the jury's award of $125 million in punitive damages against Ford, and
in the public outrage that the case engendered .... The risk-benefit
analysis concluded that 180 burn deaths could be avoided with a design
change and assigned a value of $200,000 for each life saved. Compared
with these deaths was a cost of $11 per car for 12.5 million vehicles that
amounted to $137 million. Even with burn injuries and property
damage added to the deaths caused by the existing design, the costs of
changing the fuel tank design to conform with the NHTSA standard
exceeded the value of the risk by almost $90 million.
Green, Schizophrenia,supra note 37, at 625-26.
6
See id. at 628.
70 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation
in Law, 92 MICH. L. REv.
779, 842-43 (1994). Speaking of regulatory cost-benefit analysis, Sunstein observes:
[Cost benefit analysis] may offer a less than full description of what is
really at stake, but perhaps it counteracts the forms of inconsistency
and ultimate irrationality that result in the public sector if we proceed
without quantitative help. This is a plausible defense of [cost benefit
analysis] in the real world. Whether it is right depends on pragmatic
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The account-ledger approach has its merits.7 New Jersey courts
have embraced the law and economics stance in tort and products
liability cases.7 The monetized, digital mode of analysis is a powerful
one, though it lacks the "needle-vibrating-in-the-grooves" tension of
analog methods of reproduction of experience.
Missing from the
73
monetized digital model is the beat of the heart.

judgments that cannot be resolved in the abstract. My point is that if
goods are diverse and valued in different ways, there will be
considerable crudeness in this approach to regulation. Much will be
lost even if much is also gained. We should therefore have a
presumption in favor of a much more disaggregated accounting of the
effects of regulation, one that exposes to public view the full set of
effects.
Id.

71 See Green, Schizophrenia, supra note 37, at 617-18 (explaining
the account

led er approach).
See, e.g., Snyder v. American Ass'n of Blood Banks, 144 N.J. 269, 676 A.2d 1036
(1996) (Garibaldi,J., dissenting). In her dissent, Justice Garibaldi stated:
The ordinary negligence rule is designed to encourage actors to act
only when the benefits outweigh the costs. Ordinarily, the threat of
liability will deter a person from acting if the costs outweigh the
benefits because the actor will be forced to pay those costs in a lawsuit;
if the benefits outweigh the costs, the actor will proceed knowing that it
will not be held liable and will enjoy the benefits. As a result, the
optimal outcome is achieved.
Id. at 311 (citing Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33
(1972)). Other examples of the law and economics approach include Jurado v.
Western Gear Works, 131 N.J. 375, 619 A.2d 1312 (1993), Devin v. Borough of Bogota, 124
N.J. 570, 592 A.2d 199 (1991), and Promaulayko v. Johns Manville Products Corp., 116 N.J.
505, 562 A.2d 202 (1989) ("In general, the effect of requiring the party closest to the
original producer to indemnify parties farther down the chain is to shift the risk of loss
to the most efficient accident avoider.").
73 See Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REv.
741, 787-89
(1993). Sunstein states:
There can be no question that instrumental rationality is highly
pertinent to those designing legal rules. Economic analysis is, for this
reason, exceptionally valuable for lawyers. Here it has a major
advantage over analogical reasoning, which is far less helpful on the
matter of consequences.
One cannot discover consequences by
examining other judicial holdings.
In its normative form, however, economic analysis depends on too
thin a repertoire for inquiry - that is, the notion that legal rules
should be designed so as to maximize wealth. This intuition can be
shown to be too crude and general to be right, and by making
reference to particular cases that appear to disprove it....

The hard question, not yet fully elaborated in the philosophical
literature, remains: How does one make choices in cases in which
incommensurable social goods are at stake, and in which some of these
goods must be sacrificed? An exploration of how analogical reasoning
actually works may well be helpful in this important endeavor. The
analogical thinker is alert to the manifold dimensions of social
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Unimpassioned and unromantic though it may, be, muddling
through the middle of this diverse road, as the Restatement (Third)
does, is an advisable way to proceed for those of us seeking to better
assist the jury and to improve the quality ofjustice.
VI. FACTORS TO CONSIDER

Freed from the constraints of the Wade factors, we can now
examine a wider range of considerations to assistjuries in their analysis
in products liability cases. Keeping in mind the middle approach of
New Jersey and the Restatement (Third) "middle" approach, I suggest
that a laundry list of factors should be posed from which a trial judge
can choose. We should inform jurors that they may consider these
factors in their analysis of the fundamental question. The question is
not whether
manufacturers have reduced risk to the greatest extent
14
possible, nor whether manufacturers have eliminated every element of
danger, as courts have instructed juries in Pennsylvania. 5 On the
contrary, the fundamental question is whether the product, at the time
of distribution, was reasonably fit, suitable, and safe for foreseeable
76
uses.
In determining what factors to employ, we can work from the
familiar Wade factors, of which several remain useful in the effort to
combine the "soft," value-oriented negligence approach with the "hardedged" utilitarianism of the law and economics approach to tort law.
For instance, one Wade factor still useful is "the safety aspects of the

situations and to multiple relevant similarities and differences.
Unequipped with (or unburdened by) a unitary theory of the good or
the right, she is in a position to see clearly and for themselves the
diverse and plural goods that are at stake and to make choices among
them. The very search for relevant similarities and differences places a
premium on this process of perceiving particulars.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
74 See Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem., 91 N.J. 386, 402, 451
A.2d 179, 187
(1982) ("At the core of our strict liability cases is the requirement that 'the risk from
the product be reduced to the greatest extent possible without hindering its utility.
[I]t is not reasonably safe if the same product could have been made or marketed
more safely."') (quoting Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 NJ. 191, 201,
447 A.2d 539, 544-45 (1982)).
75 See, e.g., Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 1029
(Pa. 1978).
76 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-2 (West 1987). That provision
states:
A manufacturer or seller of a product shall be liable in a Products
Liability Action only if the claimant proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that the product causing the harm was not reasonably fit,
suitable or safe for its intended purpose because it... was designed in a
defective manner.
Id. (emphasis added).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:273

product - the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the probable
seriousness of the injury.0 7 This restatement of the right side of Judge
Learned Hand's famous equation78 is a necessary aspect of any faultbased negligence analysis. The issue, however, now should be
restated in a bilateral way as follows: The safety aspects of the product the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the
injury; and the safety aspects of the proposed alternative- the likelihood that
it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of those injuries. Another
Wade factor that retains vitality is "[t]he availability of a substitute
product which would meet the same need and not be as unsafe."^M This
factor, though, must be revised as such: Does the proposed alternative
design or alternative product meet or adequately serve the same needs as the
challenged product, with improved safety?
At some point, a change in design departs so far from the product
that it no longer forms a fair basis for comparison of the challenged
product. The competing utility of killed-virus polio vaccine and liveattenuated virus polio vaccine are two products that could arguably be
called alternative designs or competing products. Considering that the
two products serve essentially identical functions, the safety of the
killed-virus polio vaccine reasonably can be used to challenge the risk
inherent in the live-virus. A similar issue might be presented by a
challenge to the dangers of the atherectomy device, a device that uses
blades to cut out coronary plaque. The substitute product, a balloon
angioplasty catheter, which cracks up the plaque, reasonably may be
posed as an alternative safer design given the essential identity of their
functions.
The Wade factor that most resembles the alternative safer design
test is also affected by the defenses established in the New Jersey

77

Wade, On the Nature, supranote 12, at 837.

78 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947).

Judge Hand stated:
Since there are occasions when every vessel will break from her
moorings, and since, if she does, she becomes a menace to those about
her; the owner's duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against
resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability
that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she
does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions. Possibly it serves to
bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the
probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B
is less than PL.
Id.
Wade, On the Nature, supra note 12, at 837.
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Products Liability Act. 0 That factor, as articulated in Wade, required
consideration of "[t ] he manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe
character of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it
too expensive to maintain its utility."8 ' When revised under the new
approach to the Model Charge, this factor presents an opportunity to
consider the diverse values appropriately at play in the risk-utility
design-defect analysis. The new model jury charge would permit a
court to expand its instructions to the jury as follows:
In assessing the proposed alternative design you should
consider whether it would unreasonably impair any essential
function of the defendant's product. You may also consider the
impact on price of the product in considering the reasonableness
or unreasonableness of the safety and the risks of harm associated
with the product as designed by the defendant or the proposed
alternative or substitute product.
You may also consider the other aspects of the product which
designers and purchasers and users may reasonably consider in
deciding whether a product is reasonably safe. These may
include:
- the reliability, longevity and durability of the product and the
alternative.

soSee N.J. STAT.

ANN.

§ 2A:58C-3. That section provides:

In any Products Liability Action against a manufacturer or seller for
harm allegedly caused by a product that was designed in a defective
manner, the manufacturer or seller shall not be liable if:
(1) At the time the product left the control of the manufacturer,
there was not a practical and technically feasible alternative
design that would have prevented the harm without substantially
impairing the reasonably anticipated or intended function of
the product; or
(2) The characteristics of the product are known to the ordinary
consumer or user, and the harm was caused by an unsafe aspect
of the product that is an inherent characteristic of the product
and that would be recognized by the ordinary person who uses
or consumes the product with the ordinary knowledge common
to the class of persons for whom the product is intended, except
that this paragraph shall not apply to industrial machinery or
other equipment used in the workplace and it is not intended to
apply to dangers posed by products such as machinery or
equipment that can feasibly be eliminated without impairing the
usefulness of the product; or
(3) The harm was caused by an unavoidably unsafe aspect of the
product and the product was accompanied by an adequate
warning or instruction as defined in section 4 of this act.
Id.
SI

Wade, On the Nature, supra note 12, at 837.
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-the repair and maintenance costs of the product and the
alternative design.
subjective considerations - the aesthetic, emotional or other
psychological effects of use of the product and the personal
pleasures, satisfaction, and emotional rewards that users associate
with the product.
-

But the law cannot provide you with a formula to answer the
question of how much weight should be given to any single factor.
The decision is entrusted to you, to your collective wisdom as
representatives of the community, to answer the essential
question: "was the product, as sold, reasonably safe?"
The final two Wade factors state:
(5)The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the
use of the product.
(6)The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in
the product and their avoidability, because of general public
or of the
knowledge of the obvious condition of the 8product,
existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
In certain cases, these two factors can be useful elaborations of the
These factors, however, should be
Learned Hand formula.
supplemented by the instruction that even a product that has obvious
dangers may be found defective if the jury concludes that the
manufacturer failed to adopt an available reasonable and safer design. 3
Thus, the charge would read as follows:
It is a complete defense if you find that the dangers of the
product were known to the ordinary consumer or user. But in
order to establish that defense the defendant manufacturer must
show that the danger could not have been feasibly reduced or
eliminated without impairing an essential feature of the product,
measurably reducing its appropriateness for its essential function.
You should therefore weigh the extent to which the elimination
of the inherent danger would impair usefulness against the extent
to which the change would improve a hazardous condition.84
In cases of medical devices and pharmaceuticals, the last two Wade
factors are particularly apt. The trade-off between health risks and
psychological benefits is a subtle one - one in which the value of
In
individual autonomy should be included in the calculus.
82

Id.

83

See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-58C-3(a) (2) (West 1987); see also Roberts v. Rich Foods,

Inc., 139 N.J. 365, 382, 654 A.2d 1365, 1373-74 (1995).
84 See Roberts, 139 N.J. at 382, 654 A.2d at 1373-74 (stating that 'juries will inevitably
weigh the extent to which the elimination of the inherent danger would impair
usefulness against the extent to which change would improve a hazardous condition").
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considering, for example, the health risks of a breast implant, a woman
reasonably may trade-off some risk for the psychological rewards of a
normal appearance after mastectomy. A man's election to trade risk for
psychological gain is equally easy to recognize in the case of medication
to treat erectile dysfunction after prostate surgery. In this area, the
value of individual autonomy tends to expand liability for breach of
duty to warn and to contract the potential for liability for design defects.
VII. WHAT THE MEANING OF "WAS" IS

The Products Liability Act states that it is a complete defense if:
"At the time the product left the control of the manufacturer, there
was not a practical and technically feasible alternative design that
would have prevented the harm without substantially impairing the
reasonably anticipated or intended function of the product."8'5
"Practical and technically feasible" generally are taken to mean
economically practical and within current (at the time of distribution)
technological capabilities. As suggested above, "practicality" should be
read broadly to include aesthetic and psychological considerations,
which some persons justifiably may consider worth certain health risks.
The utilization of the word "was" and the frequent use by the
Restatement (Third) of the word "available," however, show that we
must instruct the jury that the decisive issue is not the availability of an
alternative on the market at the time of distribution. After all, the
designer is bringing something new to the market. The decisive issue
centers on the availability of a meaningful design choice to the designer
- one that existed and that the manufacturer rejected (or failed to
recognize) at a time when the choice might have reduced or avoided
the harm that the plaintiff suffered. To hold otherwise would be simply
to ratify the existing state of affairs and thus gut design-defect products
liability litigation of its meaning and importance. 6
85 NJ.STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3(a) (2) (West 1987) (emphasis
added).

If the rules of evidence are employed aggressively to exclude expert opinion
regarding untested designs, this principle, which is basic to products liability law,
could be undermined. See, e.g., Pestel v. Vermeer Mfr. Co., 64 F.3d 382, 384 (8th Cir.
1995) (excluding evidence of alternative safer design under Rule 702 of the Rules of
Evidence and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)). In
96

Pestel, the proposed guard on a "stump cutter" had not been "tested," been "subject

to peer review," published, nor "generally accepted" in the field. See id.The court
stated:
Mr. Vidal [the expert witness] was hired to show that a guard could be
made which would have prevented the injury from occurring. He was
not prepared, however, to show that such a guard was ready for the
market - his design was not finished. Therefore, his fabricated guard
was not relevant to show that a guard could be made that would offer
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The question that must be asked is: What should a prudent
person in the designer's position have done? This is not a low standard.
The prudent person is an ideal person, not a person like any one of us.
The prudent person is never negligent and always utilizes his foresight.
The prudent person always uses his best efforts and his full
intelligence. 7 As Victor E. Schwartz put it in arguing for a negligence
standard of care in drug product cases:
[The] risk benefit analysis must be viewed at the time of
marketing, not later .... [T]he pharmaceutical company is held
to the very highest of standards. The pharmaceutical company
must act as a reasonable person would have acted in the same or
similar circumstances.
The
circumstances in which
pharmaceutical manufacturers must deal directly involve serious
risks to human life. Thus, the standard of care is not the
"reasonableness" of a person who repairs a television set or drives
a car - it is the most serious and intense obligation that one can
find in the entire body of negligence law.

protection, and yet not inhibit the use or practicality of the machine.
Id. The decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999), should stem
any such trend. Emphasizing that "the test of reliability is 'flexible,' and Daubert's list
of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every
case," the Supreme Court stated:
We can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and for all time the
applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert,nor can we now do so
for subsets of cases categorized by category of expert or by kind of
evidence. Too much depends upon the particular circumstances of the
particular case at issue . .

.

. [T]he jury must decide among the

conflicting views of different experts, even though the evidence is
"shaky."
Kumho Tire Co., 119 S. Ct. at 1177.
87 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 283 cmt. c (1965). The comment to
section 283 explains the "reasonable man" standard as follows:
In dealing with this problem the law has made use of the standard of a
hypothetical "reasonable man." Sometimes this person is called a
reasonable man of ordinary prudence, or an ordinarily prudent man,
or a man of average prudence, or a man of reasonable sense exercising
ordinary care. It is evident that all such phrases are intended to mean
very much the same thing. The actor is required to do what this ideal
individual would do in his place. The reasonable man is a fictitious
person, who is never negligent, and whose conduct is always up to
standard. He is not to be identified with any real person; and in
particular he is not to be identified with the members of the jury,
individually or collectively. It is therefore error to instruct the jury that
the conduct of a reasonable man is to be determined by what they
would themselves have done.
Id.
Victor E. Schwartz, Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Clarifying the Meaningand Policy
Behind Comment , 42 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1139, 1144-45 (1985).
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The Restatement (Third) notes that the requirement of availability
should not be used to create "artificial and unreasonable barriers to
recovery."89 The Restatement (Third) therefore makes clear that no

"prototype" need be produced.

Nor need the proposed alternative

actually have been on the market at the time of distribution of the
challenged product as long as a manufacturer could have adopted a
reasonable alternative at the time of sale.90 The essence of fault-based
tort liability, that the party charged had a fair chance to avoid the harm,
must be respected. 9
I suggest, therefore, that courts charge juries on the meaning of
"was" along these lines:
- If you find that there is a practical and feasible alternative
design which would have reduced or prevented the harm the
plaintiff suffered here, you must also ask if that choice was
reasonably available before the product left the defendant's
control. In essence, you must ask the question - did the
designers of the product have a fair chance to reduce or avoid the
harm which you have found the product caused?
- In assessing the existence of a meaningful design choice, you
may take into account the technology that existed at the time of
sale and the availability of or absence of the alternative design in
the market place. But it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove
that a safer alternative was actually available for purchase or sale
at the time the product was sold. It is enough for the plaintiff to
prove that it reasonably could have been available. The plaintiff
need not present you with a prototype. It is sufficient if the
plaintiff presents the alternative with sufficient concreteness for
you to fairly conclude that such an alternative design could have
been adopted and that it was practical and feasible at the time the
challenged product left the defendant's hands.
In assessing the defense that no practical and feasible
alternative was available, you may consider such questions as
-

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODucTs LIABILrrY § 2 cmt. g (1997).
90

See id.

This idea was famously expressed by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. See OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 115 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963).
Holmes stated:
The true explanation of the reference of liability to a moral standard,
in the sense which has been explained, is not that it is for the purpose
of improving men's hearts, but that it is to give a man a fair chance to
avoid doing the harm before he is held responsible for it. It is
intended to reconcile the policy of letting accidents lie where they fall,
and the reasonable freedom of others with the protection of the
individual from injury.
91

300

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:273

whether the defendant or others in its industry conducted
reasonable research, testing, and product development measures.
Likewise, you may consider whether the harm that could be
foreseen was so slight or so unlikely that no substantial effort was
reasonably required.
Similarly, you may conclude that any
change in the design at that time was so clearly impractical or
unfeasible that its pursuit was not reasonably required.
VIII. MAXIMIZING SAFETY
Pursuant to the current jury charge, following precedent such as
Beshada v. Johns Manville Products Corp.9 2 and Michalko v. Cooke Color &
Chemical Co.,93 NewJersey courts have instructed juries that "[a] product
may not be considered reasonably safe unless the risks have been
reduced to the greatest extent possible consistent with the product's
continued utility."

4

In formulating the new alternative safer design

charge, the committee omitted that instruction, feeling that it did not
defer sufficiently to the jury's process of valuing all relevant factors in its
reasonableness analysis. The New Jersey Products Liability Act uses the
phrase "reasonably fit, suitable and safe."95 The Restatement (Third)
articulates that the primary goal is the achievement of an "optimal"
97
level of safety.96 In one of its moves toward the green-eyeshade version
of design-defect analysis, the Restatement (Third) emphasizes the cost
of safety measures and the impracticality of putting safety above all else,
such as limiting automobiles to an unreasonably low speed.9
92

90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).

93 91 N.J. 386, 451 A.2d 179 (1982).
94 N.J. MODEL JURY CHARGES: CIVIL § 5.34D (1989).
95 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-2 (West 1987).
96 See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCTSLIABLITY § 2 cmt.
a (1997).
97 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
98

See RESTATEMENT

§ 2 cmt. a (1997). The
comment to section 2 states:
Subsections (b) and (c), which impose liability for products that are
defectively designed or sold without adequate warnings or instructions
and are thus not reasonably safe, achieve the same general objectives as
does liability predicated on negligence. The emphasis is on creating
incentives for manufacturers to achieve optimal levels of safety in
designing and marketing products. Society does not benefit from
products that are excessively safe - for example, automobiles designed
with maximum speeds of 20 miles per hour - any more than it
benefits from products that are too risky. Society benefits most when the
right, or optimal, amount of product safety is achieved. From a fairness
perspective, requiring individual users and consumers to bear
appropriate responsibility for proper product use prevents careless
users and consumers from being subsidized by more careful users and
consumers, when the former are paid damages out of funds to which
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
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New Jersey courts long have spoken of safety as an objective to be
maximized and of danger as something to be reduced to the "greatest
extent possible." As the Restatement (Third) notes, as early as 1266
victualers were subject to legal control to make sure the food supply was
safe.9 The advancement of technology has encouraged us to look for
steady advances in safety, and our products liability law has encouraged
that goal.1°° Safety, however, is a matter of reasonable calculation." '
New Jersey courts have charged juries that a manufacturer has a
duty to make products as safe as possible. That charge is an appealing
formulation, but not one that juries should take too literally. The
strength of the huge Lincoln Navigator sport utility vehicle, which
protects its occupants in a crash, may present a grave hazard to the
occupant of a Fiat 500 that might be crushed by the larger, higher,
heavier vehicle. Permitting only one size automobile would eliminate
that hazard, but at a price that would be met with universal derision.
Nonetheless, life and limb are favored values. Given these favored
values, courts should chargejuries in products defect cases that, as Lewis
suggests, "it is the duty of the manufacturer to reduce or eliminate the
dangers 0of
its products as much as existing technology and practicality
2
permit.'

the latter are forced to contribute through higher product prices.
Id. (emphasis added).
99 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 cmt.
a (1997); see
also GEORGE ROSEN, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 34-35 (2d ed., 1993) ("Medieval life
centered in the market place .... Great care was taken to keep the market clean

because of the widely held belief that dangerous foci of disease could arise wherever
food, especially spoiled food, was sold.").
100In Fabian v. Minster Machine Co., the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that
it is
a complete defense if a defendant proved that its product met the "state-of-the-art"
standard. See 258 N.J. Super. 261, 274, 609 A.2d 487, 493 (App. Div. 1992). The New
Jersey Products Liability Act articulates the "state-of-the-art" defense as follows:
The burden on a defendant who claims a state-of-the-art defense is to
prove only the technological state-of-the-art when the product was
manufactured .... It remains plaintiff's burden, unaffected by the

Products Liability Act, to prove non-conformity.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3(c) (West 1987). Judge Dreier, who wrote the Fabian
opinion, commented that the "state of the art is not the same thing as the custom of
an industry, although they may be the same if the industry employs the latest
scientific and technical development." WILLIAM A. DREIER ET AL., N.J. PRODUCTS
LIABIITY & Toxic TORTS 304 (1996).
101John W. Wade, On Product 'Design Defects' and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L.
REV. 551, 568-70 (1980) ("Clearly safety is a relative matter... [A] coherent analysis
in design defect cases requires a balancing process. An absolute test for liability is
not feasible unless one wishes to impose an insurer's liability.").
102 Lewis v. American Cyanamid Co., 155 N.J. 544, 559, 715 A.2d 967, 974 (1998).
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IX. CONCLUSION

The tension between the soft version of negligence and the greeneyeshade version that Michael Green has identified as a form of
schizophrenia is one manifestation of a tension that appears in many
areas of the law. In the law of scientific evidence, the tension is between
knowledge as socially conditioned and knowledge as hard-edged
statistical
calculation. 03 The same tension exists regarding the nature of
104
causes.
As in those situations, the tension in products liability can be
muddled through. The competing design considerations needed to
resolve the issues presented in design-defect litigation inevitably invoke
competing values. Although the market metaphor is strong and its
problem
of
the
rationalizing
function
appealing, the
incommensurability of values is with us permanently. Unlike business
contract disputes in which money is both the object and the remedy, in
personal injury litigation the choice between the money and the injury
will never be a matter of indifference to the injured person. The soft
value-diverse sense of negligence, with its appeal to wrongfulness, must
therefore be preserved. At the same time, we must present to juries the
stark fact that the green-eyeshade calculation of risk and benefit is a

103See, e.g., SHEILAJASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN

(1995) (stating that the Daubert decision's "fine disregard" for a
"philosophically coherent decision rule" embraced "the view of the philosopher Karl
Popper that science proceeds through clear falsifications of erroneous claims and the
view of constructivist sociologists of science that knowledge accumulates through
negotiation and consensus among members of the scientific community"); see also
Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1,
10 (1995) (stating that, despite its citations to logical empiricism, the Daubert court
ultimately, if unintentionally, endorsed revised empiricism by putting peer review,
publication, and general acceptance on an equal footing with testability, treating all as
equally distinctive features of science).
104 See, e.g., Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue
Bus: Factfinding at the
Frontierof Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. REV. 521 (1986). Nesson states:
My thesis, broadly stated, is that "probability" as we use the term in law,
particularly in the civil standard of proof, is not a hard-edged
mathematical concept. It is, rather, a concept that incorporates less
rigid ideas of justice and reflects the judicial function of resolving
disputes in the real world, where values shift and knowledge is
uncertain. An outcome is "probable" if it best accomplishes a just and
acceptable resolution of the dispute. Probability, as a legal concept in
the law of proof, suggests wisdom, probity, and approbation - not
favorable betting odds.
Id. at 521; see generally George W. Conk, Against the Odds, Proving Causationof Disease
with Epidemiological Evidence, SHEPARD'S SCI. AND EXPERT EVIDENCE Q. 103 (1995)
(arguing for use of flexible criteria for judgments of causation).
AMEICA 63
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powerful and important tool of governance.
governance that the jury is assembled.
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And it is to aid in

